Looking through the prism of field fortifications, Hess shows new ways in which historians should evaluate Civil War armies. He is more concerned with how effective cartographers were at plying their craft than he is with evaluating the cooperation of infantry, cavalry and artillery. How officers read the land is of more import here than how they read their opponents and Hess is more concerned with how soldiers wielded shovels and picks than he is with how they brandished rifles. While readers hoping for detailed discussions of battlefield maneuvers may be disappointed, those looking to strengthen their understanding of the Atlanta Campaign and how armies operated during the Civil War will find Hess's volume richly rewarding.
During its retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, the Army of Tennessee constructed eighteen lines of fortifications. Throughout the campaign, Sherman's army proved effective at countering these Rebel defenses and adapting to the terrain while Joseph E. Johnston proved unable to capitalize on the advantages the fortifications and the north Georgia landscape granted his army. Despite the technical nature of the military history found in these pages, Hess is effective at drawing out the human dimension of his story. Trenches, as evident in the book, were "a bizarrely confined theater of life and death" (xiv). The book is peppered with discussions of common soldiers' experiences. Misery, death, and disease were constant compatriots to trenchbound Civil War soldiers. Were the sources cited by the author devoid of contextual elements readers would be forgiven for mistaking them for testimonials regarding the First World War's Western Front. For Confederates, these deplorable conditions, argues Hess, hastened the collapse of morale and a caused a spike in desertions.
In addition to trench life, the book reveals the immense human costs armies suffered due to skirmishing and sniping. For example, one Confederate brigade took part in the battles of Peach Tree Cree, Atlanta, and Jonesboro. Nevertheless, a quarter of its casualties during this period were the result of sniping and skirmishing. While the Army of Tennessee suffered thousands of casualties in pitched battles, it also suffered death by a thousand papercuts in the form of men falling victim to sniper's bullets and small unit skirmishes. Hess understandably concludes that the Union, due to its manpower advantages, benefited from this aspect of the campaign.
Ultimately, Hess convincingly shows that "fieldworks became an all-important element of operations in 1864, helping to determine which army succeeded in its tactical and strategic goals" (xiii). The Union army emerged victorious in Georgia due in no small part to its superior defensive and offensive use of field fortifications. The book's argument is effectively encapsulated by a Union soldier quoted on page 278: "The axe, the pick and shovel have done more to bring us success in this campaign than have the rifle and cannon." 
